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Two thousand citizens marched on the streets of Boston the day of November 5, 1765, and they 
paraded burned effigies through them later that afternoon. Street leaders roamed the city while 
men of “genteel society” hid behind closed doors, fearing the destruction of their property and 
themselves.i Massachusetts Bay Governor Francis Bernard retired to Castle William outside of 
the parade’s path, as he “thought it not suitable … to be present in town, when a gross affront on 
his Majesty’s Government at home was to be publically passed.”ii The gathering of such “a gross 
affront,” not at all unfamiliar to the city, was a Boston tradition known as “Pope’s Day.” It 
commemorated the failed conspiracy to destroy Parliament in 1605. Traditionally, street gangs 
from the city’s north and south ends quarreled by throwing stones and engaging in fisticuffs to 
see which side received the honor of torching the celebratory bonfires used in burning images of 
the Pope.iii However, the tensions felt surrounding the 1765 celebration stemmed from 
legislation—not tradition. Its reserved day, November 5, bore a close proximity to November 1: 
the notorious date beginning the implementation of the Stamp Act in the colonies.  
Three months earlier, Massachusetts and its neighboring colonies took action in one of 
the first mass resistance movements in the colonies. Not even two weeks had passed since 
delegates in New York dismissed a convention founded to collectively voice opposition to the 
Stamp Act. The timing of such a brutish holiday could not have been less conducive in the eyes 
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of royal leaders, but despite their worst fears, the events that took place on November 5, did not 
culminate into the “barbarous” action that so many dreaded. Instead of capitalizing on the riotous 
behavior still alive in the colonies, North and South Enders set their differences aside for that 
occasion and marched together in opposition to the Stamp Act for local leaders to witness. The 
events on November 5 in Boston illustrate two opposing aspects of the Stamp Act crisis 
experienced in the colonies—one of violent upheaval, and one of solidarity. Both played roles in 
the years leading up to the American Revolution, and both of their roots grew from that crisis. 
The Stamp Act of 1765 simultaneously produced resistance and a foundation of unity in the 
American colonies. 
 Neither the resistance nor the unity derived from one of Great Britain’s most resounding 
diplomatic victories, two years earlier. The “Peace of Paris” formally ended the Seven Years’ 
War, and settled Europe into a brief state of peace. In the eyes of the British Parliament, the 
creation of the Stamp Act and the duties that preceded it necessitated the steps in governing an 
expanding empire on the North American continent. Britain acquired an extraordinary amount of 
land as the victor, gaining most of France’s North American territory east of the Mississippi 
River, as well as Spanish Florida and its Gulf Coast.iv The acquisition of land along the 
Mississippi River Valley and the trans-Appalachian area also gave Britain the resources to 
control and dominate most of the fur-trading business.  
These businesses resided on the frontier of an expanding empire in America, 
predominantly occupied by a large number of Native American peoples. They benefited from a 
long tradition of gift-giving and generous trade agreements with the French, on French occupied 
lands. However, for Great Britain, the acquisition of such territory added administrative woes to 
those in charge, primarily due to the large scope of responsibilities that accompanied the 
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expansion, as well as the near fiscal deterioration of the British Empire.v These shortcomings 
threatened many of the ways of life on which Native American peoples had grown dependent. As 
a result, insurrections, collectively known as “Pontiac’s Rebellion” (after the Ottawa chief that 
led the movement), occurred on new British frontier posts.vi  
Although British forces ultimately put down the rebellions, the attacks made it obvious to 
Britain that it must maintain a peaceful relationship with Native American peoples as the French 
had—even at the expense of the restless colonists who were eager to cultivate the rich land that 
laid outside of colonial boundaries. On October 7, 1763, King George III issued a proclamation 
outlining the new governments created out of the newly acquired territories, namely Quebec, 
East Florida, West Florida, and Grenada.vii The last section of the proclamation aroused the most 
unfavorable interest from colonists. The King forbade “all our living subjects from making any 
purchase or settlements whatsoever, or taking any possession of any of the lands above 
reserved,” for the Native American peoples, “in order therefore to prevent such irregularities for 
the future, and to the end that the Indians may be convinced of our justice. …”viii Colonists, who 
felt a great deal of patriotism toward their mother country over the course of the war, could not 
reap the rewards that victory had seemingly granted Great Britain, regardless of whether they 
had contributed to the conquest. 
 The need for armed forces in these new territories appears as a solution agreed upon by 
the British Parliament before Pontiac’s Rebellion occurred. An entry in the Journals of the 
House of Commons, dated March 7, 1763, includes a resolve recommending provisions for 
troops on the North American frontier, including newly acquired Quebec.ix An earlier entry, 
dated February 23, estimated the number of garrisons stationed in these areas to reach ten 
thousand.x Native American insurrections did not occur until later that summer, which showed 
3 
 
the necessity of a standing army in those territories as an essential defensive measure to maintain 
the safety of the British Empire—not as a simple precaution.  
However, the idea of deploying ten thousand troops to the frontier did not resonate well 
with those already vexed by Britain’s financial crisis. In February 1763, national debt 
dramatically increased with the onset of the war to £122,603,336.xi Post-war Great Britain 
desperately sought new forms of revenue. Although the fertile lands of the Mississippi River 
Valley promised gains for the distant future, they needed to take immediate action. The new 
Ministry, headed by George Grenville, acknowledged the significant lack of taxation in America 
in comparison to that within England.  
 To offset the expenses of the army, Parliament resolved to levy a series of direct and 
indirect forms of taxation on its colonies. The realities surrounding both the need for troops in 
the colonies and the need to formulate ways to pay for them created a keen awareness in 
Grenville. When he took office, he acknowledged the preposterously low revenues accumulating 
from the current customs duties. This lack of revenues had resulted from an ineffective customs 
administration in charge of regulating colonial trade and collecting duties. Customs deputies 
preferred to accept duties. Even after Grenville tightened the administration, laws on the books 
regarding the Acts of Trade, still extremely inadequate, could not produce a sufficient revenue 
during such a financial crisis. Grenville determined that the Acts of Trade required revisions. On 
March 9, 1764, he announced his planned changes to the House of Commons in a series of 
resolutions that, when enacted, became known as the Sugar Act.xii 
The resolutions added new duties affecting colonial commerce, which included new 
duties on wine, coffee, and pimento. In addition, the resolutions ended refunds, or drawbacks, on 
re-exported European and Asian textiles.xiii However, the most controversial resolution came 
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with the lowering of the duty on foreign molasses, from six pence to three pence per gallon.xiv 
Due to their ability to dodge customs duties altogether under the former, weaker, customs 
administration, merchants dreaded this new provision, as three pence seemed unbearable. Shortly 
after its proposal, an amendment added to the list of resolutions called for the increased 
jurisdiction of the admiralty courts in the colonies.xv These courts, located in Halifax, could try 
violators of the new duties without the privilege of juries. Admiralty courts also gained clear 
jurisdiction over common-law courts, freeing them from local judges under the possible 
influence from the merchants standing trial. 
 It is clear that Grenville sought to strengthen the role that Britain played in regulating 
colonial trade. The predicted revenues expected from the Sugar Act largely failed to address the 
British debt or the cost of the expanding empire. In the fifteenth resolution to Parliament 
announced in March, Grenville introduced not only the resolves which constituted the Sugar Act, 
but also the possibility of another duty—a direct tax on the colonies. Grenville suggested, “It 
may be proper to charge certain stamp duties in the said colonies and plantations.”xvi Although 
postponed for another year, the proposal for the Stamp Act became a law by March 1765, forcing 
the colonists to address it. The Act prescribed taxes for a number of legal documents, customs 
documents, diplomas, newspapers, pamphlets, even playing cards and dice. All printed materials 
required specific stamped parchment paper purchased from colonial stamp distributors.xvii Unlike 
the Sugar Act, largely a merchant’s burden, nearly every colonist faced the possibility of the 
burdensome duties of the Stamp Act at some point.  
 As the probability of stamp duties levied in the colonies became more plausible, colonists 
believed that their implementation violated the very nature of the relationship between Great 
Britain and the colonies. The nature of that betrayal found roots in the question that many people, 
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British and American alike, attempted to answer time after time in the coming years: did the 
sovereignty of Parliament imply the right to directly tax the colonies? Grenville recognized that 
the proposal of the Stamp Act sparked controversy within Parliament itself.xviii However, he 
appealed to the notion that Parliament, as an authority, could levy duties on the colonies. 
According to Edmund S. Morgan, Parliament “was not likely to reverse its opinion when asked 
to exercise the right.”xix Parliament’s assertion of its authority added another element to the 
Stamp Act. Aside from raising a revenue, the Act reinforced the notion that Parliament held 
sway over the colonies’ charters.xx From the colonists’ perspective, the Stamp Act reflected 
disregard of the very nature of colonial assemblies and representative government as a whole. 
Since the founding of their colonial charters, assemblies had acquired some level of home rule. 
Each colony, whether headed by a royal governor or a popularly-elected one, enjoyed the right to 
administer itself. Due to the absence of colonial representation in Parliament, this became the 
only method by which English citizens living in the colonies found representation by a governing 
body. 
 While introducing his intentions to impose stamp duties on the colonies, Grenville half-
heartedly gave the opportunity for colonial assemblies to raise money themselves, as opposed to 
Parliament levying the Stamp Act. In March 1764, Grenville postponed any action regarding 
stamp duties until Parliament’s next session. The postponed action came as a means “to consult 
the ease, the interest, and the good will of the colonies … to offer any objections they might have 
to the tax, or to suggest some more satisfactory tax.”xxi The colonies, more than willing to submit 
their own forms of taxation, lacked correspondence from Grenville and his secretaries as to the 
extent to which their alternative taxes would be sufficient. Neither Grenville nor any person 
assigned to draft a potential bill provided the assemblies with any instruction. Various assemblies 
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addressed these grievances to their colonial agents in Parliament, partially the ill-manner in 
which Grenville announced the opportunity for alternative measures.  
These colonial agents met with Grenville at least three times in an attempt to inquire the 
means necessary for colonial assemblies to devise their own forms of taxation. However, each 
meeting concluded with the same realization: Grenville, perhaps from the beginning, had no 
intentions of allowing the colonies to tax themselves, as he willingly withheld information from 
the colonies preventing them from doing so. Instead of distributing the necessary information, 
Grenville told the agents during a meeting on May 17, 1764 that the assemblies should instead 
“signify their assent to such a bill in general.”xxii Grenville also made clear in these meetings that 
Parliament felt little sympathy, and that petitions or protests concerning financial responsibilities 
would not be tolerated.xxiii It became apparent to the colonists that formal means of voicing 
opposition to Parliament were not going to change the nature of the deteriorating relationship. If 
the colonists wished to stand firmly behind what they regarded as important values of the British 
Constitution, such as taxation under clear representation, unprecedented measures must take 
place. Over the course of several months, these measures incited both resistance and unity within 
the colonies.  
 The passage of the Stamp Act resulted in the first collective resistance movement in the 
American colonies. Long before discussions about colonial taxation began, colonists 
implemented lasting traditions of exerting civil authority when formal means of policing failed to 
defend local interests. Uprisings, though, as Pauline Maier put it, “were extra-institutional in 
character more often than they were anti-institutional.”xxiv They acted in part due to the absence 
of a law, or when local leaders’ ability within the constraints of the law failed to cope with a 
problem. No matter the cause, because interpreting the legality of the uprisings found no 
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precision in practice, Parliament did not respond with any legal action. Should a conflict emerge, 
distinguishing which party exerted force lawfully and which did not, proved difficult.xxv 
However, only conflicts that truly needed them allocated such means. The more authority 
exerted, the more it spoke of the shortcomings on behalf of a government.xxvi 
During the 1760s, the notion of citizens with the right to exert force became a strong 
unifying element in the colonies, both in the North and South. The use of extra-legal authority 
paralleled the political philosophies of those who considered themselves “Real Whigs.” A 
definitive principle in Whig justification concerning uprisings consisted of people, creators of 
government, were free to reclaim political authority if lost to failed magistrates.xxvii Although 
followers of Whig ideology believed in the exertion of force, its purpose consisted of 
strengthening current governments—preventing them from further decay. Force used as an initial 
response to tyranny found no acceptance. According to Whig ideology, every means possible to 
rid spoilages in government found primacy before resorting to force. Submission was the sign of 
good government, and the end result for which people should fight. In the context of the Stamp 
Act, however, not many people in the colonies wanted to fight for submission under this 
particular act of government. Colonial assemblies originally pursued the route of appeasing the 
“Real Whigs.” Through petitions and protests sent to their colonial agents and presented to 
Parliament, they met with no real address or debate whatsoever. A different approach voicing 
opposition was needed.  
The initial stirrings of resentment toward Parliamentary authority came in part with elite 
leadership. Before massive crowds would take the streets, privileged men took to the halls of 
colonial assemblies beginning the resistance movement that gained momentum in the following 
months. In Virginia, May 1765, during a meeting of the House of Burgesses, the newest member 
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of the body, Patrick Henry, waited until the majority of Assemblymen were on their way back to 
their plantations before he began the great debate.xxviii He then submitted a series of resolutions 
against the Stamp Act to the House, citing that colonists carried as many rights as if they were 
subjects living in Great Britain, and that taxation by colonial assemblies would be less 
burdensome on the people, given that assemblies knew what their constituents could bear.xxix 
When leaked to the press, the four original resolves now contained an additional three resolves 
more radical in language. These additional resolutions claimed that Virginia’s assembly had the 
sole right to tax colonists, its habitants were not bound to yield to any form of taxation not 
created by the assembly, and that any person sympathizing with Parliament’s measures of 
taxation would be deemed “an enemy to His Majesty’s colony.”xxx These resolves served as a 
catalyst for other colonies to write their own resolutions, and publish them in various 
newspapers. Every other colony, aside from Georgia, New Hampshire, and North Carolina, 
produced resolves against the Stamp Act. Some resolutions, such as ones in Rhode Island, 
contained even more radical language.xxxi 
Opponents to the Stamp Act not only objected to the taxation but also derailed the 
weaknesses in arguments defending the Act. None was as widely read as the pamphlet written by 
Maryland lawyer and member of the Governor’s Council, Daniel Dulany. Although not printed 
until October, his famous piece Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British 
Colonies became the most popular form of literature in the colonies criticizing Parliament’s 
defense of the Stamp Act. Dulany attempted to prove Grenville wrong, who ironically shared the 
belief that no one should bear taxation without their consent or the consent of their 
representatives. Dulany and Greenville disagreed on the notion of virtual representation—the 
idea on which Grenville rested the legitimacy of the Stamp Act. Throughout his pamphlet, 
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Dulany intentionally avoided challenging Parliament’s authority as far as the more radical 
writers, but the idea of virtual representation prompted a strong response.  
Not bound to any one constituent, virtual representation assumed that a legislator 
represented the entire nation. In other words, no individual actually bound legislators, but 
“virtually” everyone bound them.xxxii Furthermore, Dulany compared taxation without consent to 
thievery, writing, “[T]o give property, not belonging to the owner, is such evident and flagrant 
injustice, in ordinary cases, that few are hardly enough to avow it.”xxxiii Dulany’s writings 
resonated with many colonists who rarely, if ever, felt a direct connection to Parliament.  
By August 1765, after various resolves circulated through newspapers across the country, 
riots against stamp distributors in almost every colony proved the most effective way to evade 
the Act’s implementation, which was set for November. Governor Bernard of Massachusetts 
credited the circulation of resolves as the primary instigator for resistance, writing that “[T]he 
publishing [of] the Virginia resolves, proved an alarm bell to the disaffected.”xxxiv In other words, 
the circulation of the various resolves stirred up profound resentment toward the Act for locals 
affected by the duties imposed on items used in their daily lives. The violence began in Boston 
on the morning of August 14 when at five o’clock “the effigy of a gentleman sustaining a very 
unpopular office, viz. that of Stamp Master”xxxv was found hanging in a tree outside of his home. 
The effigy represented Andrew Oliver, the newly appointed stamp distributor for the colony. The 
Sheriff, along with a group of men, attempted to take down the effigy, “but could not do it 
without imminent danger of their lives.”xxxvi Shortly after the sun came up, a crowd of South 
Enders pulled the image down and paraded it to Oliver’s dock, where a new brick building, 
suspected as the new Stamp Office, was demolished and “thoroughly effected in about half an 
hour.”xxxvii After the mob returned to inflict damage onto his house and garden, Oliver responded 
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to the mob by saying the next day that he “absolutely declined having any concern in that 
office.”xxxviii  
As the events contributed too much discussion around the city in the following days, it became 
apparent that the Oliver riots were unique and well-organized compared to former uprisings. The 
effigy burnings and the looting of the Oliver home captured public attention, and for the most 
part people supported the mob’s actions and participated in the mob action.xxxix  
The possibility of evading the Stamp Act came with the notion that without stamp 
distributors to implement the tax, no one would enforce the Act. Other colonies soon followed 
Massachusetts’ example. On August 27, the Rhode Island distributor resigned and two days later 
the Maryland distributor, Zachariah Hood, fled to New York out of fear from seeing the hanging 
of his effigy.xl On September 19, a crowd met Jared Ingersoll in Wethersfield, Connecticut to 
demand his resignation. He first “refused to comply, but it was insisted upon, that he should 
resign his office of Stamp-Master, so disagreeable to his countrymen.”xli He eventually 
capitulated, and after reading his resignation aloud Ingersoll “went into a tavern, and dined with 
several of the company.”xlii Ingersoll, targeted for his associations with the Act and its 
administration, not for his connections to the British government in general, feared little after his 
resignation.   
The New York riots of October 31 and November 1, 1765 saw a great number of seamen 
participating in them, making up one fourth to one fifth of the rioters.xliii Following the war, 
thousands of discharged sailors relied heavily on the shipping industries of New England for 
employment. The post-war Acts that threatened these industries also threatened their livelihood. 
Boycotting efforts, intended to hurt British businessmen, affected these sailors as well. Instead of 
acting out against New England merchants, they opposed England’s new attitude on colonial 
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trade.xliv Most of the riots throughout the colonies consisted of burning distributors in effigy, 
staging mock funerals, tearing down buildings (future offices and colonial agents’ homes), and 
posing threats towards the Act’s sympathizers.  
If physical resistance failed to assert the colonists’ opposition effectively, a collective 
effort of boycotting British goods did not. Boycotting efforts began as early as 1764 with the 
passage of the Sugar Act. Merchants, hit heaviest by the Act, urged colonists to replace British 
manufacturers with American. They attempted to dissuade women from wearing expensive 
dresses imported from Europe. Widows should stop wearing luxurious black gloves to mark the 
mourning process, and American brew should be preferred to British ale, for example.xlv After 
the Sugar Act passed, a post-war depression settled in the colonies. The effects of it rippled to 
England as well, and the boycotts resulting from the Act only made things worse.xlvi With the 
implementation of the Stamp Act, merchants again saw an opportunity to display economic 
resistance. The greatest account of merchants uniting together to combat the Act occurred when 
a group of two hundred New York merchants met in October of 1765 to discuss a solution on 
their behalf. After deliberation, they published their own resolves intended for their business 
correspondents in England. Regarding orders sent to Great Britain, they resolved to “direct their 
correspondents not to ship them, unless the Stamp Act be repealed” and that “orders already sent 
home, shall be countermanded by the very first conveyance.”xlvii It is difficult to determine the 
success of those boycotts, but proof of their effects exist in two different writings from London 
merchants. 
 The first one, a petition written to Parliament in January of 1766, tells of the hardships 
that creditors and merchants experienced due to the decline of trade after the passage of the 
Stamp Act. The petition informed Parliament “that this commerce, so beneficial to the state, and 
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so necessary for the support of multitudes, now lies under such difficulties and discouragement, 
that nothing less than its utter ruin is apprehended, without the immediate interposition of 
Parliament.”xlviii Colonists, who collectively owed “several million sterling” declared to business 
correspondents that “it is not in their power, at present, to make good their engagements, 
alleging, that the taxes and restrictions laid upon them” were too burdensome to pay off their 
debts.xlix The second proof of the boycotts’ effects is a letter from the Committee of London 
Merchants addressed to the Lord Mayors in England, dated March 6, 1766. The merchants called 
a general meeting to address “the present state of the British Trade to North America, and the 
Prospect of increasing embarrassments, which threaten the loss of our depending Property there 
and even to annihilate the Trade itself.”l Colonists, ironically, capitalized on the delicate state of 
Britain’s financial crisis—the catalyst for passing such Acts in the first place.  
The formation of the Stamp Act Congress in 1765 proved the most significant step 
toward colonial unification in the years leading up to the American Revolution. The concept of 
the Congress, devised in June 1765, followed a lively debate in the Massachusetts Assembly that 
focused on the Stamp Act and other “objectionable legislation enacted by Parliament.”li 
Following the debate, Assembly members decided that “letters be forthwith prepared and 
transmitted to the respective speakers of the several Houses of Representatives and Burgesses in 
the colonies” in order to conduct a meeting “to consult together on the present circumstances of 
the colonies, and the difficulties to which they are and must be reduced. …”lii Sent on June 8, the 
Speakers of each of the colonial assemblies received drafts of the circulating letters advising 
them to select a committee of representatives to participate in a convention. The convention’s 
organizers sought an October 7 beginning date, for a meeting that was set to take place in New 
York. It is important to note that the concept of this Congress began after Henry passed his 
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resolves in Virginia in May. However, virtually no one outside of the colony knew of their 
existence as their publication came in late June, approximately three weeks after the 
Massachusetts Assemblymen began to circulate the letters. This shows a growing opposition 
movement within the colonies, yet absent of a collective unity that the convention hoped to 
build. 
The delegates first sought to take “into Consideration the Rights & Privileges of ye 
British American Colonists with the several inconveniences and hardships to which they are and 
must be subjected by the Operation of several late Acts of Parliament.”liii They advocated three 
main issues: trials by juries, the right to tax themselves, and the reduction of the authority 
bestowed upon admiralty courts. They debated for the first ten sessions before agreeing on a list 
of declarations that reflected their “Humble Opinion respecting the most essential Rights, and 
Liberties of the Colonists.”liv The declarations reflected their belief that they held the rights of 
Englishmen who lived within Great Britain, including the absence of taxation without their 
consent given their lack of representation in Parliament. The right to a trial by jury, self-taxation, 
and a claim of loyalty to the British crown were also included in the resolves.lv Delegates sought 
to strengthen and uphold what they regarded as values of the British Constitution; they saw 
themselves not as revolutionaries, but as English subjects fighting to preserve their endangered 
rights. This reinforced the Whig ideology that stressed purifying government, not dismantling it 
altogether. 
The Stamp Act Congress fostered a sense of colonial unity that transcended regional 
boundaries. Although they did not know each other and relatively unaware of the problems the 
Stamp Act caused in other colonies, members traded information thus growing an awareness of 
similarities concerning their situations. They identified a common target for their protests—the 
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wrongful acts of Parliament. It allowed colonists to come together to express dissatisfaction in a 
singular voice, one more powerful than individual expression. According to C.A. Weslager, it 
seemed obvious “that the colonies would accomplish more by acting in concert instead 
individually, that it would appear to have been the natural course to follow. But in the context of 
the period it was an innovative approach … and the originator of the idea of an intercolonial 
congress made a significant contribution to American political history.”lvi 
As momentum continued to grow in opposition to the Act, colonists recognized a need 
for communication and to coordinate a movement of opposition. In Boston, during the onset of 
the August 14 riot, a group called the “Loyal Nine” created and hanged the effigies of Andrew 
Oliver and made him resign from the office of Stamp Master.lvii Social clubs like the Loyal Nine 
organized outside of New England, as well. The “Charleston Fire Company,” comprised of local 
volunteer firemen, resisted the Stamp Act in South Carolina, and members of the Dutch 
Reformed Church made up a resistance group based in Albany. They viewed themselves as 
“sons of liberty” opposing what they regarded as unconstitutional acts of Parliament.lviii The need 
for unity among the groups emerged independently. According to some scholars, New York held 
the role as the chief instigator for such a movement. Towards the end of 1765, organized 
meetings took place in country fields in order to accommodate the large crowds wanting to join 
the opposition. By early 1766, associations of the Sons of Liberty emerged in both Maryland and 
New Jersey. They sought not only to establish correspondences with other colonies, but also to 
organize associations at the town, county, and colonial levels. Southern colonies, such as 
Virginia and North Carolina, saw a more gradual emergence of similar associations. They shared 
correspondences with those in the North, as well.lix 
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The movement to unite people who identified with the Sons of Liberty transcended both 
economic class and gender. Those who led the group were typically of the mercantile and 
professional classes, but laborers, making up the majority of their ranks, worked extremely close 
with the merchants and lawyers that lead them. The Sons of Liberty generally consisted of 
artisan workers, shopkeepers, day laborers, carpenters, seamen, smiths, and other members of the 
working class.lx The British Parliament’s infringement of their rights united this diverse group of 
workers. This, of course, allowed the Sons of Liberty to win a mass base as they strove to 
convert an entire population into a body that sympathized with the group’s motives. New York 
groups founded by independent tradesmen who worked for their status contrasted with the 
groups in Rhode Island that prominent men had formed.lxi The Sons also did not exclude women 
from their ranks. They founded their own auxiliary in the Daughters of Liberty—women 
permitted to sit in the same meetings and celebrate the same victories as their male counterparts. 
Including women proved absolutely crucial in the efforts of nonimportation. Women wove 
homespun cloth for clothing, drafted the standards of the nonimportation agreements themselves, 
and refused to let their families consume any of the boycotted items. The Sons of Liberty 
welcomed them with open arms in their movement. Samuel Adams often stated, “With the ladies 
on our side, we can make every Tory tremble.”lxii 
After the repeal of the Stamp Act in March of 1766, and despite a growing sense of 
unification, these associations had every intention to disband. Their very purpose lay in 
opposition to what they regarded as Parliament’s extra-legal assault on their rights. Once 
Parliament repealed the Act, most abandoned their associations, but leaders in New York 
warned, “[I]f hereafter any attempts should be made to deprive us of our invaluable Freedom, or 
Religious Rights,” they would “not be backward in joining … with Hearts and Hands to oppose 
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such Measures.”lxiii The events of the following years proved that these levels of unity and 
resistance lasted longer than they anticipated, as colonial opposition awakened again over the 
Townshend duties in 1767. A continuing and growing opposition only further strengthened the 
associations’ causes, preparing the colonies for revolution.  
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